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Abstract. It is widely argued that shadow banking grew rapidly before the recent
nancial crisis because of rising demand for money-likeclaims. This paper assesses a key
premise of this argument: that investors actually treated short-term debt issued by shadow
banks as a money-like claim. I present a model where the nancial sector and the central
bank jointly respond to demand for money-like claims. The model generates predictions
about the prices and quantities of Treasury bills, central bank reserves, and shadow bank
debt. These predictions are borne out in the data, suggesting investors did treat shadow
bank debt as money-like.
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A key function of nancial intermediaries is to provide savers with money-likeclaims
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990). Indeed, many argue that secu-
ritization grew rapidly before the recent nancial crisis precisely because it was a nancial
innovation that enabled intermediaries to supply more money-like claims (e.g., Gorton and
Metrick, 2010a,b, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2013). In this narrative, the
so-called shadow banking systemused highly-rated, long-term securitized bonds as col-
lateral to back the issuance of money-like, short-term claims. These claims, while not used
directly in transactions, had the short-term safety and liquidity needed to function as stores
of value, and thus serve as imperfect substitutes for money. In response to growing demand
for such money-like claims from institutional investors and rms, the shadow banking system
manufactured more of this short-term debt.
Despite the prominence of this narrative in the literature, its basic premise remains
untested. Did investors treat short-term debt issued by the shadow banking system as a
money-like claim? The key contribution of this paper is that it is the rst to show empir-
ically that investors did indeed treat shadow bank debt as a money-like claim. It does so
by documenting detailed, high-frequency, micro-evidence of tight interlinkages between the
markets for Treasury bills, central bank reserves, and short-term shadow bank debt.
My approach is to rst esh out the money-creation view of shadow banking by presenting
a model where the nancial sector and the central bank (Federal Reserve) jointly respond
to the demand for money-like claims. The model generates predictions about the prices
and quantities of Treasury bills, reserves, and shadow bank debt. I then document that the
models predictions are borne out in data from the period before the 2007-2009 nancial
crisis.
In the model, there are three claims that provide monetary services: traditional bank
deposits, Treasury bills, and shadow bank debt. Households are willing to pay a premium
for such claims, some of which the nancial sector can endogenously produce. The model
has two key, novel features. First, di¤erent claims deliver di¤erent amounts of monetary
services. Second, the model links the demand for monetary services to monetary policy
because banks demand central bank reserves when they issue deposits. The Federal Reserve
sets the amount of reserves to implement its target policy rate.
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A critical insight that emerges from the model is that if deposits, Treasury bills, and
shadow bank debt all deliver monetary services, then the behavior of prices and quantities
across the markets for these claims will be interlinked. In particular, increased demand for
monetary services will be associated with (i) high prices (low yields) on claims that provide
monetary services and (ii) an endogenous increase in the supply of those claims by the
nancial sector and the Federal Reserve. This has the following cross-market implications:
 Low yields on Treasury bills should be associated with the issuance of shadow bank
debt.
 The issuance response of the shadow banking system should be concentrated in short-
maturity debt.
 Low yields on Treasury bills should be associated with open market operations that
increase the supply of reserves.
 Low yields on Treasury bills should be associated with high federal funds rates relative
to the target policy rate.
The rst prediction is driven by the fact that investors treat shadow bank debt and
Treasury bills as (imperfect) substitutes in the model. When the demand for Treasury bills
is high, as reected by low Treasury bill yields, the demand for shadow bank debt is also
high. The shadow banking system accommodates this demand by increasing issuance.
The last three predictions explicitly connect the demand for shadow bank debt and
Treasury bills to the demand for monetary services. Investors in the model demand shadow
bank debt and Treasury bills at times when they highly value liquidity and central bank
reserves.
I evaluate these predictions in the data. A critical empirical di¢ culty is that low-
frequency variation in the demand for money-like claims is likely to be driven by changing
economic fundamentals, and thus is di¢ cult to separate from broader macroeconomic con-
ditions. Therefore, I focus on relatively high-frequency, weekly variation. This variation,
driven by the need to make payments, manage payroll and inventories, pay dividends, and
transact more broadly, is easier to isolate from background changes in economic conditions.
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Many of the empirical specications utilize weekly data with year-month xed e¤ects to iso-
late this high-frequency variation. The analysis focuses on asset-backed commercial paper
(ABCP) because data is more readily available for ABCP than for the other major type
of short-term shadow bank debt, repurchase agreements (repo). Moreover, Krishnamurthy,
Nagel, and Orlov (2013) argue that ABCP was a larger source of short-term nancing for
the shadow banking system than repo was.
I examine the pre-crisis period from July 2001, when weekly data rst became available,
through June 2007, just before the collapse of the ABCP market at the beginning of the
nancial crisis. The empirical evidence supports the model. Each of the models predictions
is borne out in the data. In addition, I also provide evidence that the results cannot be
explained by the alternative explanation that ABCP issuance is driven by the nancial
sectors need for nancing.
The results provide strong evidence that investors treated ABCP as a money-like claim,
thus substantiating the basic premise of many explanations for the growth of shadow banking.
An extrapolation from my high-frequency estimates suggests that a sustained increase in
money demand could explain up to 50% of the growth in ABCP in the years before the
nancial crisis. Consistent with the idea that money demand played an important role in
the growth of ABCP in the pre-crisis period, I provide evidence that the elasticity of ABCP
supply has increased over time. Thus, the same demand shock now produces a larger increase
in the quantity of short-term debt. The growth of securitization, by increasing the supply of
collateral available to back ABCP, likely played an important role in increasing the elasticity
of supply.
Overall, the results suggest that the demand for money-like claims was a signicant
driver of the growth of shadow banking in the pre-crisis period. This paper makes two main
contributions relative to the existing literature on safe assets (e.g., Gorton and Metrick,
2010a; Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick, 2011; Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2013).
First, it provides evidence that the growth of shadow banking was driven by demand for
claims that provide money services, as opposed to claims that are simply short term. The
existing literature shows that Treasury bills are substitutes for privately issued short-term
debt, but does not empirically identify reasons that investors treat these claims as substitutes.
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In contrast, this paper provides evidence that investors treat these claims as substitutes
because the claims provide money services. It does so by considering the behavior of the
Federal Reserve and analyzing the market for reserves, which is novel both theoretically and
empirically.
The second respect in which the paper is unique is in its focus on the shadow banking sys-
tem, as opposed to traditional commercial banks. Many nancial innovations have a¤ected
the ability of the nancial system to provide liquidity over time, but I focus on ABCP and
the shadow banking system for two reasons. First, they played a central role in the nancial
crisis. Attempts to understand the origins of the crisis, as well as regulations to avoid future
crises, require a better grasp of what drove the growth of the shadow banking system. Sec-
ond, the growth of ABCP is representative of a broader shift in nancial intermediation from
traditional commercial banks to securities markets. It is important for both nancial and
monetary economics to better understand the extent to which these markets can perform
the same functions as banks. I show that the nancial system responds to shocks to the
demand for money-like claims even when the central bank succeeds at pinning the policy
rate at its target. The results are relevant to the conduct of monetary policy, particularly
now that nancial stability has become a critical focus for central banks in the aftermath of
the crisis.
1 Model
1.1 Setup
I begin by presenting a model to help understand the patterns that would arise in the data
if investors and households regarded ABCP as a money-like claim. There are three sets
of agents in the model: households, banks, and the monetary authority (i.e., the Federal
Reserve). For simplicity, all agents are risk neutral.
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1.1.1 Household demand
There are three types of claims that provide money services in the economy: deposits,
Treasury bills, and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). Assume that each claim provides
a di¤erent amount of monetary services. A dollar of deposits provides a quantity of these
services D, which I normalize to 1. A dollar of Treasury bills provides T > 0 of monetary
services. Finally, a dollar of ABCP provides ABCP > 0 of monetary services.
Denote the dollar (principal) amount of deposits mD, the dollar amount of Treasury bills
mT , and the dollar amount of ABCP mABCP . Assume that the total amount of e¤ective
money services in the economy aggregates with a constant elasticity of substitution as
M =

m
 1

D + Tm
 1

T + ABCPm
 1

ABCP
 
 1
; (1)
where  is the elasticity of substitution between deposits, Treasury bills, and ABCP.1 House-
holds have downward-sloping demand for these services. In particular, following Krish-
namurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), I assume that households maximize E
P
tCt

;
where Ct = ct + v (M). v (M) is a reduced-form function for the utility from consuming
total money services M , and  > 0 is a money demand shifter  a notational device that
allows us to examine the e¤ects of an increase in demand for all money-like claims simply
by taking comparative statics with respect to . In the Internet Appendix, I show that
households with this utility specication require gross returns
RD = R  v0 (M)

M
mD
1=
for deposits,
RT = R  T v0 (M)

M
mT
1=
for Treasury bills, and
RABCP = R  ABCP v0 (M)

M
mABCP
1=
for ABCP,
(2)
whereR is the gross return for claims that are not money-like. The gross return on money-like
claims is lower than R because households derive additional utility from money services. I
call the di¤erence between the returns required on money-like claims and the return required
1Why might these claims be imperfect substitutes? One answer is that the types of money services they
provide are di¤erent. Treasury bills and ABCP provide safety and liquidity, while deposits provide safety,
liquidity, and transaction services (e.g., check writing).
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on non-money claims the money premium. Note that the premium is given by the marginal
value of money services provided by a particular claim.2 For instance, the money premium
for ABCP is given by
@
@mABCP
[v (M)] = v0 (M)
@M
@mABCP
= ABCP v
0 (M)

M
mABCP
1=
: (3)
The comparative statics derived below will focus on the e¤ects of variation in the demand
shifter . Assume that v0 > 0 and v00 < 0 so that money services provide positive but
decreasing marginal utility.
1.1.2 Supply of Money-like Claims
The money-like claims households value are produced by the government, which controls the
quantity of Treasury bills, and banks, which can produce deposits and ABCP.3 I take the
supply of Treasury bills as exogenous. Below, I argue that this assumption is reasonable for
the high-frequency variation on which the empirics rely.
Assume that there is a continuum of banks of mass one. Each bank is small and thus
takes the aggregate quantity of money services and the prices of money-like claims as given.
On the asset side, banks may hold reserves or invest in productive projects. Assume that the
return on reserves is zero, while the return on productive projects is F > R in expectation.
On the liability side, banks can nance themselves from three sources: (i) equity or long-
term bonds,4 (ii) deposits, and (iii) ABCP. Assume that the size of each banks balance
sheet is xed in the short run, so that banks simply pick the composition of their assets and
liabilities.5
Let br be the fraction of a banks assets held as reserves,dmD be the fraction of its liabilities
2Nagel (2014) argues that the level of short-term interest rates plays an important role in determining
this premium at low frequencies.
3In practice, the distinction between traditional commercial banks and shadow banks is somewhat blurred.
There are small commercial banks, which only issue deposits, standalone shadow banks, investment vehicles
which only issue ABCP, and large nancial institutions, which do both. For simplicity, the banks we model
issue both deposits and ABCP.
4There is no distinction in pricing between bonds and equity in the model since we assume households
are risk-neutral.
5This assumption simplies the analysis by eliminating a variable but is not crucial. Similar results would
obtain if we had banks pick the size of their balance sheets as well.
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that are deposits, and dmABCP be the fraction of its liabilities that are ABCP. Then the banks
balance sheet is given by
Assets Liabilities
Projects (1  br) Long-term bonds (1 dmD   dmABCP )
Reserves br Deposits dmD
ABCP dmABCP
(4)
Each bank chooses br,dmD, and dmABCP to maximize its prots. Long-term debt provides
no money services and, therefore, requires gross return R. By issuing deposits and ABCP,
banks can lower their funding costs, capturing the money premium associated with each
claim. However, issuing either deposits or ABCP each comes at a cost. Assume that raising
ABCP has a private cost from the banks perspective of c ( dmABCP ). As discussed in Section
4.2, the e¤ects of innovations like securitization that make it less costly to issue ABCP can
be captured by thinking about changes in c ().
The cost of raising deposits comes from the fact that the bank needs to hold reserves at the
Federal Reserve to protect itself from the payment-related uncertainty generated by deposits.
Specically, since deposits are demandable, the daily payment-related inows and outows
associated with them cannot be perfectly forecasted. These inows and outows change the
banks net balance in its account with the Federal Reserve, and it is costly for the bank to end
the day with a negative balance because there are signicant overdraft fees. As a result, when
they issue deposits, banks hold reserves as a precaution against overdrafting their accounts
with the Federal Reserve.6 Let r (dmD) be the quantity of precautionary reserves that banks
endogenously choose to hold. I assume that r0 () > 0 so that precautionary reserves are
increasing in the amount of deposits issued by the bank. In the Internet Appendix, I provide
a microfoundation for this assumption.
Reserves are costly to obtain because they are in xed supply: the Federal Reserve sets
the total quantity of available reserves, R. Thus, to hold reserves, banks must purchase
6Banks may also choose to hold reserves against their ABCP liabilities. However, these reserves are likely
to be smaller than the reserves held against deposits, because unlike deposits ABCP is not immediately
demandable. We can think of br as the incremental reserves banks choose to hold against deposit liabilities
over and above reserves held against other liabilities.
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them in the interbank market. The cost of purchasing reserves in the interbank market
is the federal funds rate. Assume the Federal Reserve endogenously sets the quantity of
reserves in the banking system R (i) to implement its target federal funds rate i. Further,
assume that the target rate i is derived from a Taylor (1993)-style rule, reecting ination
and output-gap concerns outside the model, not the short-run money demand considerations
isolated in the empirics.
1.1.3 Discussion of Model Setup
Before solving the model, a few aspects of the setup are worth discussing. First, the level of
demand for money-like claims  is modeled in reduced form. Many models of money demand,
including Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) among others, derive demand in an optimizing
framework where households trade o¤ the lower interest paid by money-like claims against
their need to transact. My focus is on variation in demand over time and the supply response
of the shadow banking system, so a simpler model where demand can be varied with a single
parameter () is su¢ cient. Relatedly, I take no stand on the source of variation in money
demand from the household sector. The household sector can be broadly thought of as a
proxy for actual households, non-nancial corporations, and unmodeled parts of the nancial
system. Thus, variation in demand could stem from payrolls, inventories, dividends, and
certain transactions in nancial markets, among other sources.
Second, I take the money services provided by ABCP, ABCP , as given. Why might
ABCP provide money services? First, its short-term safety makes it a good store of value.
ABCP is typically backed by securitized bonds that are themselves AAA rated. In addition,
virtually all ABCP programs are covered by guarantees from their sponsoring institutions
to protect investors from loss. A second characteristic of ABCP that may provide money
services is its liquidity. While secondary markets for commercial paper are not highly liquid
(Covitz and Downing, 2007), the short maturity of ABCP allows investors to convert it into
cash for transactions on short notice. Given that the underlying securitized bonds also appear
to have relatively illiquid secondary markets (Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman,
2013), this liquidity through maturity of ABCP may be important for its provision of
money services.
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A third feature of the model setup meriting discussion is the treatment of reserves. In
practice, the demand for reserves in the federal funds market is ultimately driven by two
sources: reserve requirements and payments and clearing. Reserve requirements apply to
transaction deposits at all depository institutions (Board of Governors, 2005). However,
banks have found ways to avoid reserve requirements, weakening their bite over time. Thus,
reserve demand from banks is modeled as being driven by payments between banks.7 When
clients use their deposits for payments, banks use the federal funds market to transfer the
funds. Specically, the bank of the payer sends reserves to the bank of the payee. This
reduces the quantity of reserves in the account of the bank of the payer at the Federal
Reserve, and increases the quantity of reserves in the account of the bank of the payee.
These transactions leave the total quantity of reserves unchanged in the aggregate because
reserve balances are deducted from one bank and credited to another in any transaction.
However, according to the Federal Reserve, a depository institution may aim to hold
some positive excess reserve balances at the end of the day as additional protection against an
overnight overdraft in its account.Thus, because banks that end up with negative balances
in their accounts at the Federal Reserve are charged overdraft fees, transactions a¤ect the
aggregate demand for reserves. When they anticipate transactions, as they will when they
have large deposit liabilities, banks will hold reserves as a precaution against overdrafts.
See Poole (1968) and Ho and Saunders (1984), as well as the Internet Appendix of this
paper, for theoretical models of this phenomenon. Carpenter and Demiralp (2006) provide
empirical evidence, arguing that because banks use their Federal Reserve accounts to clear
transactions for themselves and their customers, the demand for reserves tends to be higher
on days with large expected volumes of payments.
7In practice,the reserve requirement depends on the deposits issued over a prior period. This means that
a shock to the demand for money services creates demand for reserves at two horizons. Payments-driven
precautionary demand for reserves is contemporaneous with the shock to money demand. Demand driven
by reserve requirements follows the shock to money demand with a lag. Reserve-requirement driven demand
can be incorporated into the model by adding a second period. The rst period would be similar to the
existing model, with a random realization of money demand . This realization of money demand would drive
precautionary demand for reserves in the rst period and reserve-requirement based demand for reserves in
the second period.
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1.2 Equilibrium
I now solve for the equilibrium. First consider the problem of an individual bank and then
the problem of the Federal Reserve. Individual banks take the aggregate money quantities
M , mD, mT , and mABCP , as well as the prevailing federal funds ratebi, as given. In addition,
the model parameters i, , , v (), r (), F , c (), and R are taken as given. Thus, individual
banks are price takers and take the required returns RABCP and RD as given, even though
those required returns are determined by aggregate issuance decisions in equilibrium.
Banks solve for their individually optimal quantities of ABCP ( dmABCP ), deposits (dmD),
and reserves (br). Since the mass of banks is 1, in equilibrium aggregate quantities sat-
isfy mD = dmD, mABCP = dmABCP , and M = m 1D + Tm 1T + ABCPm 1ABCP  1 . An
individual banks problem is
maxbr;dmD; dmABCP
Asset Returnz }| {
F  (1  br)  Cost of Fundingz }| {R +dmD  (R RD) + dmABCP  (R RABCP ) Cost of ABCPz }| {c ( dmABCP ) 
Cost of Reservesz}|{br bi
(5)
subject to the constraints
br = r (dmD) anddmD + dmABCP  1. (6)
If banks are at an interior optimum in their capital structure decisions so thatdmD+ dmABCP <
1 holds strictly, then the equilibrium is simple.
The rst order condition fordmD implies
bi+ F = R RD
r0 (dmD) = 1r0 (dmD)v0 (M)

M
mD
1=
: (7)
The benet of adding a unit of deposits is that the bank can capture the money premium
that deposits carry, v0 (M)

M
mD
1=
. The cost of adding this unit of deposits is that r0 (dmD)
reserves must be purchased in the interbank market, and r0 (dmD) fewer units of productive
projects are held on the banks balance sheet.8 Thus, the prevailing federal funds rate bi is
8The fact that adding reserves forces the bank to forego productive investment is a product of the
assumption that the banks balance sheet is xed in the short run. In a model where banks can adjust the
sizes of their balance sheets, this e¤ect would vanish.
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linked to the money premium on deposits through reserve holdings.
The rst order condition for dmABCP is simply
c0 ( dmABCP ) = R RABCP = ABCP v0 (M) M
mABCP
1=
: (8)
For the bank, the benet of adding a unit of ABCP is the money premium that ABCP
carries, ABCP v0 (M)

M
mABCP
1=
. The marginal cost is c0 ( dmABCP ).
To compute the equilibrium, rst note that market clearing for reserves and symmetry
imply r (dmD) = R, where R is the aggregate quantity of reserves in the interbank market.
Denote the equilibrium quantity of deposits mD (R) = r 1 (R) and dene
M (R) =

mD (R)
 1
 + Tm
 1

T + ABCPm
 1

ABCP
 
 1
: (9)
Substituting this into the rst order condition fordmD yields
bi+ F = v0 (M)
r0 (mD)

M
mD
1=
; (10)
which determines the prevailing federal funds ratebi as a function of the quantity of reservesR.
Finally, the Federal Reserve endogenously sets the quantity of reserves R (i) to implement
the target federal funds rate bi = i: That is, R (i) is implicitly dened by
i+ F =
v0 (M (R (i)))
r0 (mD (R (i)))

M (R (i))
mD (R (i))
1=
: (11)
The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The market equilibrium is given by Equations (8) and (11), which together
dene a xed point in R and dmABCP = mABCP .
Proof. All proofs are given in Appendix C.
1.2.1 Comparative Statics
Now consider how prices and quantities vary in the model with the level of money demand,
. I begin by characterizing the supply response of the Federal Reserve and banking system
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to higher levels of money demand. The following proposition characterizes their response.
Proposition 2 Suppose the elasticity of substitution between deposits and ABCP is  > 1.
Then the Federal Reserve and the banking system respond to higher levels of money demand
 by increasing the supply of reserves and ABCP respectively. Formally, @R=@ > 0 and
@mABCP=@ > 0.
The key intuition behind the Federal Reserves response is that it keeps the federal funds
rate at its target. The prevailing federal funds rate bi is determined by the money premium
on deposits, v0 (M) (M=mD)
1=. Increasing the level of money demand  increases this
premium, holding xedM and mD. Thus, banks will wish to issue more deposits to capture
this larger premium. This raises their demand for reserves and thus the prevailing federal
funds rate. To push the rate down to the target i, the Federal Reserve must then increase
the supply of reserves.
The ABCP supply response is driven by similar logic. For higher values of , banks can
capture a larger money premium by issuing ABCP, and therefore issue more ABCP. The
total supply response of banks and the Federal Reserve drives down the money premium on
deposits until v0 (M) (M=mD)
1= has the same value it did previously, so that the federal
funds rate remains at its target.
Note that since deposits and ABCP are imperfect substitutes, control over the federal
funds rate does not give the Federal Reserve control over the quantity of ABCP produced.
The increase in reserve supply does not fully crowd out the banking sectors production of
ABCP.
What is the level of the T-bill yields after these supply responses by the Federal Reserve
and the banking sector? The following proposition shows that higher levels of money demand
 are associated with lower equilibrium yields, despite the supply responses.
Proposition 3 Suppose there is an increase in . After the supply responses of the Federal
Reserve and the banking system, the equilibrium T-bill yield RT is lower than its initial level.
Formally, @RT=@ < 0 if  > 1.
This result relies on the assumption that deposits are imperfect substitutes for Treasury
bills and ABCP. After an increase in money demand , yields fall. The Federal Reserve
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increases the supply of reserves to push the federal funds rate back to its target. However,
since deposits are imperfect substitutes for Treasury bills and ABCP, this increase in the
supply of reserves does not fully restore yields on Treasuries and ABCP to their initial
levels. Similarly, Treasuries and ABCP are imperfect substitutes, so the banking sectors
ABCP supply response does not fully restore the T-bill yield, RT , to its original level either.
Finally, consider the e¤ect of increasing the supply of Treasury bills. The following
proposition shows that this has similar e¤ects to decreasing the level of money demand .
Proposition 4 Suppose there is an increase in Treasury bill supply mT . The banking system
responds by decreasing the supply of ABCP, and the equilibrium T-bill yield RT increases.
Formally, @mABCP=@mT < 0 and @RT=@mT > 0 if  is su¢ ciently large.
The intuition here is that increasing the supply of Treasury bills increases the overall
supply of money services. This decreases the marginal value of money claims. In turn, this
smaller money premium reduces the incentives for banks to issue ABCP, so they decrease
the quantity outstanding. Essentially, increases in Treasury bill supply reduce the residual
demand for money-like claims that is not met by Treasury bills.
2 Empirics
In the empirics, I evaluate these propositions using a weekly data set beginning in July 2001,
when 4-week bills were reintroduced to the set of Treasury securities. I focus on the pre-crisis
period and end the sample in June 2007, just before the collapse of the ABCP market. Table
1 presents summary statistics. The paper presents results for the entire sample period, but
in untabulated results I nd similar results when I examine the 2001-2004 and 2004-2007
subperiods separately.
Using high-frequency (weekly) data has two main advantages. First, six years of weekly
data gives us a reasonably long time dimension to work with. Second, low-frequency variation
that may be due to changing macroeconomic conditions can be eliminated. For instance,
Figure 1 shows that there is a time trend in ABCP outstanding over the sample period.
Furthermore, the trend is not linear so a simple linear control will not fully absorb it. I will
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use weekly di¤erences, which render the variables stationary, and year-month xed e¤ects
to eliminate this kind of variation.
2.1 Taking the Model to Data
To operationalize the model for empirical work, suppose that there are two sources of exoge-
nous variation: (i) variation in overall money demand  and (ii) variation in the supply of
Treasury bills mT . In general, these sources of variation are not exogenous. Money demand
is a function of output and thus the state of the macroeconomy. Similarly, the government
tends to run budget decits during recessions, at low frequencies, so the supply of Treasury
bills may tend to rise in bad times.
However, at the weekly frequencies studied, variation in money demand is driven by
factors like weekly and bi-weekly payroll, inventory management, dividend payments, and
nancial market transactions (Poole and Lieberman, 1972; Cochrane, 1989; Faig, 1989).
Similarly, as pointed out by Du¤ee (1996), Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006), and Green-
wood, Hanson, and Stein (2013), there is seasonal variation in the Treasury bill market
at the weekly level due to tax receipts and government outlays. This type of variation,
which the empirics seek to isolate, is more likely to satisfy identifying restrictions than is
lower-frequency variation.
Taking shocks to money demand  and Treasury bill supplymT as the sources of variation,
the model generates the following predictions:
 Prediction 1: Propositions 2 and 3 imply that low yields on Treasury bills should fore-
cast ABCP issuance. An increase in money demand  lowers T-bill yields. In response
to high demand, banks should issue ABCP. Put di¤erently, increased demand should
raise both quantities and prices, and low T-bill yields are a proxy for high prices.
 Prediction 2: Proposition 4 implies that Treasury bill issuance and ABCP issuance
should be negatively correlated. If ABCP and T-bills are substitutes, an increase in
Treasury bill supply mT should crowd out ABCP issuance.
Predictions 1 and 2 stem from the fact that ABCP and T-bills are partial substitutes in
the model: both claims can satisfy the demand for money-like claims.
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Crucially, the model also provides predictions that explicitly link the common demand
for ABCP and T-bills to the demand for money services. This is important because it is
di¢ cult to directly verify that ABCP provides money services. The following predictions
draw the link indirectly:9
 Prediction 3: The issuance of short maturity ABCP should respond most strongly to
T-bill yields. Shorter maturity ABCP should provide more money services (i.e., have
higher values of ABCP ) and therefore should respond more strongly to money demand
shocks.10
 Prediction 4: Propositions 2 and 3 imply that low T-bill yields should forecast increases
in the supply of reserves by the Federal Reserve. In the model, low T-bill yields indicate
high money demand  and thus high reserve demand. To keep the federal funds rate
at its target, the Federal Reserve must accommodate this demand by increasing the
supply of reserves.
 Prediction 5: Finally, the expression for the prevailing federal funds rate (7) shows
that if the Federal Reserve does not perfectly stabilize the funds rate, it should be high
when the T-bill yield is low.11 In the model, high money demand  is associated with
low T-bill yields and high values of the federal funds rate bi before the Federal Reserve
adjusts the supply of reserves appropriately. The federal funds rate is essentially the
cost of an input (reserves) needed to create more money-like assets.
2.2 Alternative Explanations
Before proceeding, it is worth briey discussing the main alternative explanation I hope
to rule out. The main alternative is that high-frequency changes in ABCP supply, rather
9The predictions about open market operations and central bank reserves make the indirect link as direct
as possible. Reserves are at the very heart of the formal money supply.
10In the Internet Appendix, we extend the model to allow banks to issue di¤erent types of ABCP that
deliver di¤erent amount of money services and formally prove this result.
11This would be the case, for instance, in the presence of unanticipated shocks to money demand. In the
model, the Federal Reserve can keep the federal funds rate exactly at the target because money demand 
is known exactly. In practice, however,  may not be perfectly observable. There are both expected and
unexpected shocks to money demand for instance, Hamilton (1996, 1997) uses Federal Reserve daily errors
in forecasting the supply and demand for reserves to show that the federal funds rate is decreasing in the
quantity of reserves supplied.
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than demand, drive the empirical results. Under this alternative, ABCP provides no money
services, and issuance is driven by banksneed for nancing at high frequencies.
The critical distinction between the money demand-based explanation formalized in the
model and the supply alternative is the following. Under the supply alternative, there are
no linkages between the markets for ABCP and Treasury bills and no linkages between the
markets for central bank reserves and Treasury bills. This has two implications. First, the
supply of Treasury bills should not be correlated with the supply of ABCP and reserves at
high frequencies. Put di¤erently, if ABCP, deposits, and T-bills are not substitutes, then
there is no reason for banks to avoid issuing ABCP and deposits in weeks when T-bill issuance
is high. Second, yields on Treasury bills should not be correlated with ABCP issuance at
high frequencies. If anything, a ight to quality story would imply that T-bill yields should
be low in bad times, when banks have fewer loans to nance. Thus, under the ight to quality
alternative hypothesis, T-bill yields should be positively correlated with ABCP issuance, the
opposite of what the money demand story predicts.
In contrast, under the money demand explanation, Treasury bill yields should reect
demand for money services and should therefore be correlated with the supply of ABCP and
reserves. In the empirics, I show that this is the case: the information in T-bill yields alone
is useful for forecasting the supply of ABCP and reserves at high frequencies.
2.3 Data
The data come from several sources. Interest rates are from the Federal Reserve H.15 Sta-
tistical Release. Data on ABCP outstanding comes from the Commercial Paper Rates and
Outstanding Summary, also a Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release. Data on open mar-
ket operations come from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. Weekly data on Treasury
bills outstanding are from the US Treasury O¢ ce of Debt Management. Data on monetary
aggregates are from the Federal Reserve H.6 Statistical Release.
The overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate, which is obtained from Bloomberg, will play an
important role in the empirics. The OIS rate represents the expected average of the federal
funds rate over a given term.12 Like most swaps, no cash is exchanged at the initiation of an
12Formally, the OIS rate is the xed rate in a xed-to-oating interest rate swap. When two counterparties
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OIS contract, and at maturity only the required net payment is made. Thus, OIS contracts
carry little credit risk and are a good proxy for risk-free rates purged of liquidity and credit
risk premia (Brunnermeier, 2009; Du¢ e and Choudry, 2011; Feldhutter and Lando, 2008;
Gorton and Metrick, 2010a; Schwarz, 2010 ). Moreover, since no cash is exchanged up-front,
OIS is not a rate at which banks can raise funding. For these reasons, it serves as a suitable
a baseline for the overall level of short-term interest rates. In particular, the T-bill - OIS
spread should capture the information in T-bill yields about the money premium.13 Using
the T-bill - OIS spread essentially strips out variation in the T-bill yield driven by changes
in the overall level of short-term interest rates.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 ABCP Issuance Decreases with T-bill Yields
I now turn to the empirical results. Table 2 Panel A examines Prediction 1: low T-bill
yields should forecast ABCP issuance. In the model, low yields indicate high money demand
because investors are particularly willing to pay for the incremental money services provided
by Treasury bills. The shadow banking sector should respond to this increased demand by
issuing more ABCP.
To examine this prediction, I examine the relationship between net ABCP issuance and
the T-bill - OIS spread. Specically, I run the following regression:
 ln (ABCP Outstandingt) =  +   T -bill  OISt 1 + "t: (12)
The rst column shows the raw relationship, which is strongly negative and signicant as
predicted by the model. When money demand is high, T-bill yields are low, and issuance
is high. When money demand is low, T-bill yields are high, and issuance is low. Figure
enter into the swap, one agrees to pay the OIS rate and in return receive the geometric average of the daily
overnight Federal Funds rate over the term of the contract. Thus, the OIS rate should represent the average
of the Federal funds rate over the term of the contraction. There may be a small term premium component
as well, but over the 1-month horizon we focus on, this is likely to be negligible.
13In the Internet Appendix, we show that we obtain similar results if we use the spread between the
Federal Funds target rate and T-bill yields. The di¤erence between using the target rate and OIS is that
OIS correctly reects short-term expected changes in the target.
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2 presents this relationship as a scatterplot. The second column adds year-month xed
e¤ects to show that the relationship is not driven by low-frequency common trends in ABCP
outstanding and the T-bill - OIS spread. The remainder of the table shows that the results are
also robust to controlling for the lagged level of ABCP outstanding, lagged ABCP issuance,
and week-of-year xed e¤ects. This shows that the results are not simply capturing some
kind of mechanical mean reversion or predictable weekly pattern in ABCP issuance and
spreads.
The magnitudes of the e¤ects are economically plausible. Spreads are measured in per-
centage points, so the regressions imply that a 1% lower spread is associated with 1-2% more
ABCP issuance. In the pre-crisis period, the T-bill - OIS spread has a mean of -23 basis
points (bps) and a standard deviation of 19 bps. Of course, it would be surprising if the
magnitudes were very large, given that I am examining high-frequency variation.
The small magnitudes are also reassuring because they admit a plausible mechanism
through which the shadow banking system can adjust to changing money demand. In the
model, banks adjust by changing their mix of long-term debt versus short-term deposit
and ABCP nancing. In practice, it may be unlikely that banks alter their long-term debt
issuance in response to week-to-week changes in money demand. However, other types of
issuers in the shadow banking system are able to more quickly respond. Over 30% of ABCP
in the precrisis period was issued by issuers that purchase securities on the secondary market.
These issuers, including securities arbitrage programs, structured investment programs, and
collateralized debt obligations, can quickly respond to money demand shocks by nancing
secondary market purchases of the underlying securitized bonds with short-term ABCP
(Covitz, Liang, and Suarez, 2013).
Table 2 Panel B shows that the results are robust to using an alternative measure of the
premium on Treasury bills, the z-spread. The z-spread is the spread between actual T-bill
yields and tted yields from a spline. The tted yields are constructed based on Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Wright (2006), who estimate the Treasury yield curve using only Treasury notes
and bonds with remaining maturities greater than three months. Thus, the z-spread is a
measure of the deviation of actual T-bill yields from an extrapolation based on the rest of the
yield curve. Consistent with the idea that Treasury bills provide greater money services than
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long-term Treasuries, tted yields are typically signicantly higher than actual yields. Table
2 Panel B shows that low z-spreads forecast ABCP issuance, consistent with the predictions
of the paper. When T-bills are particularly expensive relative to longer term Treasuries, this
is a sign that money markets are tight. The banking sector then responds by issuing more
ABCP.
2.4.2 Treasury Bills and ABCP Issuance
I next turn to Prediction 2: Treasury bill issuance and ABCP issuance should be negatively
correlated. In the model, increasing the supply of Treasury bills increases the total supply
of money services in the economy, driving down their marginal value. This decreases the
premium on money-like claims, reducing the shadow banking systems incentive to issue
ABCP.
Table 3 Panel A shows that this is the case, regressing net ABCP issuance on net Treasury
bill issuance. The rst column shows the raw relationship, which is negative and signicant.
Figure 3 presents this relationship as a scatterplot. When Treasury bill issuance is high,
ABCP issuance is low. The remaining columns show that the results are robust to con-
trolling for year-month xed e¤ects, lagged ABCP outstanding, lagged ABCP issuance, and
week-of-year xed e¤ects. The relationship is always negative, and statistically signicant
in every column except the second. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013) provide
corroborating evidence. Examining low-frequency (annual) changes, they nd a negative
correlation between the supply of Treasuries and the quantity of bank deposits.
In the model, the predicted negative correlation was derived by considering the response
of the shadow banking system to an exogenous increase in Treasury bill supply. Is this
a reasonable assumption for the empirics? To be interpreted as evidence in favor of the
model, Treasury bill supply shifts at high frequencies need to be unrelated to the conditions
determining ABCP issuance. High-frequency Treasury bill issuance is largely driven by
seasonal variation in the governments outlays and tax receipts (Du¤ee, 1996; Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Wright, 2006; and Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein, 2013). In particular, weekly
Treasury bill supply is unlikely to be correlated with the nancial systems need for nancing.
Does the relationship between ABCP issuance and Treasury bill issuance line up with
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the relationship between ABCP issuance and yields in the way the model predicts? By
increasing the total supply of money services, increased Treasury bill issuance should reduce
their marginal value. This should increase the T-bill - OIS spread because investors then
care less about the money services o¤ered by Treasury bills. The lower marginal value of
money services decreases the shadow banking systems incentives to issue ABCP.
Panel B of Table 3 shows that the data are consistent with this mechanism. I run an
instrumental variables regression, regressing ABCP issuance on the T-bill - OIS spread,
instrumenting for the spread with Treasury bill issuance. Relative to the results in Panel
A, the new information in Panel B comes from the rst stage regression, which shows that
the T-bill - OIS spread does indeed increase with Treasury bill issuance as predicted by the
model. Essentially, the panel shows that the timing of the relationship between spreads and
ABCP issuance lines up correctly with the timing of the relationship between T-bill issuance
and ABCP issuance.14
2.4.3 Short-Term ABCP Responds Most
So far I have shown that the data are consistent with the idea that ABCP is a substitute for
Treasury bills. The remaining results explicitly connect the demand for Treasury bills and
ABCP to the demand for money services.
I begin by analyzing Prediction 3: the issuance of short-maturity ABCP should respond
most strongly to demand shifts. As discussed above, issuance of claims that provide the
most money services should respond the most strongly to increases in money demand. It
seems plausible to assume that short-maturity ABCP o¤ers greater money services than
long-maturity ABCP. Secondary markets for commercial paper are not very liquid (Covitz
and Downing, 2007), so much of the liquidity of ABCP stems from the fact that it has a short
maturity. Thus, the household sector should be willing to pay a particularly high money
14Note that our approach is somewhat di¤erent than a standard instrumental variables approach for
identifying supply elasticities. A typical instrument would shift money demand holding other determinants
of ABCP outstanding constant. Here we are essentially dividing money-like claims into private claims
(ABCP and deposits) and government claims (Treasury bills). Any variable that shifts price while holding
the private supply curve xed (i.e., satisfying the exclusion restriction) is su¢ cient to identify the private
supply elasticity. As argued above, the change in government supply is such a variable. Changes in Treasury
supply essentially shift around the residual demand for money-like claims that is not met by Treasury bills,
while holding the private supply curve constant.
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premium for short-maturity ABCP.15
I use data on gross ABCP issuance from the Federal Reserve Board, which is broken out
by maturity, to test this prediction in Table 4. Panel A shows that gross issuance of very
short maturity (1-4 day) ABCP responds most negatively to the T-bill - OIS spread. When
T-bill yields are low, short-maturity ABCP issuance rises sharply. For longer maturities, the
strength of the relationship weakens, eventually turning positive for the longest maturities.16
The relationship here is not perfectly monotonic, but the regression coe¢ cients generally
increase with maturity. Moreover, in untabulated results, I nd that the weighted average
maturity of ABCP issuance is negatively correlated with the T-bill - OIS spread.
2.4.4 Open Market Operations Decrease with T-bill Yields
I next link the demand for ABCP and Treasury bills to money demand by connecting it to the
banking systems demand for central bank reserves. Prediction 4 is that increases in money
demand should decrease the T-bill - OIS spread and lead the Federal Reserve to increase the
supply of reserves. An increase in money demand increases demand for deposits. When they
issue deposits, banks then wish to hold more reserves, raising the prevailing federal funds
rate. In order to keep the federal funds rate at its target, the Federal Reserve injects reserves
into the banking system.
Panel A of Table 5 examines this prediction, running the regression:
ln (RESERV E INJECTIONt) =  +   T -bill  OISt 1 + "t: (13)
The rst column shows the raw relationship, which is strongly negative and signicant as
predicted by the model. When money demand is high, T-bill yields are low, and the Federal
Reserve injects more reserves. When money demand is low, T-bill yields are high, and the
Federal Reserve injects fewer reserves. Figure 4 presents this relationship as a scatterplot.
15The logic of Modigliani-Miller (1958) would imply that the shadow banking system should be indi¤erent
to issuing di¤erent types of ABCP. However, this logic breaks down in the presence of a money premium.
If investors are willing to pay a money premium for money-like claims, above and beyond any risk premia
they charge, then by issuing money-like claims, the banking sector can capture the money premium without
bearing any additional risk. This ability to earn a riskless prot breaks the Modigliani-Miller argument.
16The positive relationship for long maturities shows that ABCP issuers not only increase their total
issuance in response to money demand; they also rotate the composition of their liabilities.
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The second column adds year-month xed e¤ects, and the third column adds week-of-year
e¤ects. The relationship remains negative and signicant, indicating that it is not driven by
low-frequency trends or predictable weekly patterns. The nal three columns repeat the ex-
ercise, excluding weeks when the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) makes
a policy announcement. This demonstrates that the results are not driven by the implemen-
tation of changes in the Federal Reserves policy stance. Note that because I have already
demonstrated that ABCP and T-bills are substitutes, these results suggest that the demand
for ABCP is linked to the demand for reserves, even though no price information from the
ABCP market is being used.
Again, the magnitude of the coe¢ cients is economically plausible. A 1% lower T-bill
yield leads to a $1530 billion larger reserve injection, relative to a mean injection of $35
billion and a standard deviation of $16 billion.
Panel B of Table 5 examines a prediction of the money demand story that does not come
directly from the model. When the Federal Reserve conducted open market operations in the
pre-crisis period, it accepted three types of collateral: Treasuries, the debt of the Government
Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs), and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) guaranteed by the
GSEs. A natural prediction of the money demand story is that when money demand is
high the banking sector would like to obtain additional reserves using the least money-like
collateral, thus maximizing the net creation of money services. In particular, the fraction
of reserve injections collateralized by Treasuries should decrease, assuming that Treasuries
provide more money services than GSE debt and MBS. I examine this prediction by running
the specication
%nonTREASURY_COLLATERALt =  +   T -bill  OISt 1 + "t: (14)
The coe¢ cients here are negative and signicant, as predicted by the model. A 1%
decrease in T-bill yields results in a 10% or larger increase in the use of non-Treasury collat-
eral. These results are consistent with the idea that new reserves are created with the least
money-like collateral when money demand is high (i.e., when T-bill yields are low).17
17An alternative interpretation of the results is that they simply reect variation in Treasury supply rather
than money demand. It could just be that the T-bill yield is low when the supply of Treasuries is low, and use
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2.4.5 Federal Funds Rate Rises as T-bill Yields Fall
I now turn to Prediction 5: deviations of the prevailing federal funds rate from the target
rate should be negatively correlated with the T-bill - OIS spread. Prior to the reserve supply
response of the Federal Reserve, an increase in money demand should increase demand for
reserves, driving up the federal funds rate. At the same time, the T-bill yield should fall,
because investors highly value the money services o¤ered by Treasury bills. Of course, in the
model, the Federal Reserve anticipates changes in money demand, so the prevailing federal
funds rate is always pegged to the target. However, if the increase in money demand were
unanticipated by the Federal Reserve, one would obtain this prediction.
Table 6 examines the prediction, running the regression:
T -bill  OISt =  +   (FED FUNDSt   TARGETt) + "t: (15)
The rst four columns run the regression at a weekly frequency. The rst column shows the
raw relationship, while the second column restricts the sample to weeks when the Federal
Reserve Open Market Committee does not make a policy announcement. The third column
adds year-month xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cients are negative but typically not statistically
signicant. This is not surprising. At a weekly frequency, the Federal Reserve has time to
push the prevailing federal funds rate back to its target by adjusting the supply of reserves
in response to unanticipated money demand shocks.
The next four columns of the table run the same regressions at a daily frequency. Here,
the evidence is more consistent. Days when the federal funds rate rises relative to its target
are days when the T-bill - OIS spread falls. Note that because I have already demonstrated
that ABCP and T-bills are substitutes, the results in Panel B suggest that the demand
for ABCP is linked to the demand for reserves, even though no price information from the
ABCP market is being used.
of non-Treasury collateral is high when the supply of Treasuries is low. However, in untabulated results, we
nd that the e¤ect remains if we control for the supply of Treasury bills outstanding, though the statistical
signicance is sometimes weaker.
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2.4.6 Other Money Quantities Decrease with Spreads
The empirics up to this point have documented interlinkages between markets for the three
claims in the model: Treasury bills, central bank reserves, and ABCP. I can also ask whether
low T-bill - OIS spreads are in fact a proxy for high money demand by examining other
markets for money-like claims. Increases in demand should raise prices and quantities. If
low spreads are indeed a proxy for high money demand, they should be correlated with high
quantities of money-like claims beyond those explicitly modeled above. Table 7 examines
this prediction directly by looking at contemporaneous relationships between spreads and
quantities of money-like claims. I run regressions of the form
ln (Mt) =  +   T -bill  OISt + "t; (16)
where Mt is some measure of the quantity of money. Each column in the table examines a
di¤erent measure of the quantity of money.
The rst column uses the quantity of reserves in the banking sector as a proxy for Mt.
There is a negative and signicant relationship, which is not surprising given the results in
Table 5. In the second column, the quantity of deposits in the banking sector is negatively,
but not signicantly, related to the spread. The third and fourth columns show that the
assets under management of money market mutual funds are negatively but insignicantly
correlated with the spread. The fth column shows that the size of the money supply, as
measured by M2, is negatively and signicantly associated with the spread.
Finally, the sixth column examines a di¤erent type of proxy: the dollar volume trans-
actions going over the Fedwire Funds payment system. Fedwire is used for payments and
clearing services between nancial institutions. To the extent that these transactions are
driven by transactions in the real economy, this transaction volume reects money demand.
The data are only available monthly, so I cannot use year-month xed e¤ects as in the other
specications; instead I use year-quarter xed e¤ects. The results show that Fedwire trans-
action volume is negatively and signicantly correlated with spreads, consistent with the
money demand view.
Overall, there is suggestive evidence that some monetary quantities are negatively corre-
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lated with spreads. This is consistent with the money demand story and the use of spreads
to proxy for demand at high frequencies.
2.4.7 Other Corroborating Evidence
In this section, I briey discuss other results consistent with the idea that the shadow banking
system responds to money demand. First, Table 8 examines the response to money demand
shocks of other issuers of short-term debt. Table 8 Panel A examines the behavior of the
primary dealers, another channel through which the shadow banking system can respond
to money demand shocks. In particular, the liabilities of the primary dealers may provide
more money services than some securities and less money services than others. Thus, when
money demand is high, the dealers should reduce their positions in securities that provide
a lot of money services and increase their positions in securities that provide few money
services. Concretely, if the short-term debt of a primary dealer is more money-like than
corporate bonds but less money-like than Treasury bills, I should expect dealers to increase
their holdings of corporate bonds and decrease their holdings of bills when money demand
is high.
Table 8 Panel A examines this prediction. I run regressions of the aggregate net position
(long minus short) of the primary dealers in a given security type on the T-bill - OIS spread.
Column 1 examines dealer positions in Treasury bills. The coe¢ cient is positive and signif-
icant. When money demand is high, T-bill yields are low, and the dealers hold few T-bills,
supplying more to the market. When money demand is low, T-bill yields are high, and the
dealers hold more T-bills. Column 2 controls for T-bills outstanding to rule out alternative
explanations based on variation in the supply of Treasury bills. The remaining columns show
that dealer positions in all Treasury securities and GSE debt decrease when T-bill yields are
low. In contrast, net positions in GSE-guaranteed MBS and corporate securities increase
when T-bill yields are low. This is consistent with the money demand story. Treasuries and
GSE debt provide more money services than the liabilities of the primary dealers. Therefore,
when money demand is high, the dealers hold less of these securities. In contrast, MBS and
corporate securities provide less money services than the liabilities of the primary dealers.
27
Thus, when money demand is high, the dealers hold more of these securities.18
Table 8 Panel B analyzes the behavior of commercial paper that is not asset-backed,
which is comprised of unsecured commercial paper issued by nancial and non-nancial
rms. Specically, Table 8 Panel B regresses the log net issuance of unsecured commercial
paper on the T-bill - OIS spread. Consistent with the idea that other issuers also react to
money demand, the table shows that low T-bill yields forecast the issuance of unsecured
commercial paper. The e¤ects are not as strong as those documented for ABCP in Table
2 Panel A, consistent with the idea that the elasticity of ABCP supply is high because
securitization provides a large supply of assets that can be used to collateralize ABCP, an
idea which is discussed further below.
In addition, the Internet Appendix presents another set of results consistent with the
idea that the shadow banking system responds to money demand. The rst set shows that
money market spreads are highly correlated with each other but not with movements in
longer-maturity yields or stock market returns. This is consistent with the money demand
story. In the model, the level of money demand  should drive the spreads of all money-like
claims, but is not strongly linked to broader market conditions at high frequencies.
3 Discussion
3.1 Cumulating the Demand-Side Evidence
To summarize, the empirical results provide strong evidence in favor of the model presented
in Section 2, where variation in the demand for money services plays an important role in
driving ABCP issuance. Tables 2 and 3 show that ABCP and T-bills are partial substitutes:
increased demand for ABCP and T-bills leads to higher prices and quantities. Tables 4-
7 explicitly link the demand for ABCP and T-bills to the demand for monetary services,
demonstrating that the demand for these claims is high at the same time that demand for
18An alternative explanation for these results is that the primary dealers are simply engaging in a carry
trade, buying longer-term and riskier securities when short-term yields are low. Note that the table controls
for the term spread and the Baa-Aaa spread. This helps to rule out this alternative. The results cannot
be explained by a story where the dealers simply hold MBS and corporate bonds when the term spread or
credit spreads are high.
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liquidity and central bank reserves is high.
I now briey discuss what the high-frequency estimates imply about the low-frequency
growth of ABCP in the years before the crisis. Figure 1 shows the growth of ABCP over the
sample period, which is concentrated from mid-2004 to mid-2007. ABCP outstanding grew
8% from January 2001-June 2004 and 70% from June 2004-July 2007.
Extrapolating from Table 2 Panel A, I can try to assess how much of this growth is related
to the demand for money-like claims. Specically, I can compare spreads from June 2004-
July 2007 relative to January 2001-June 2004, asking whether the results in Table 2 Panel A
would predict higher issuance. Many caveats are in order in interpreting such a calculation.
First, throughout the paper I take no stand on the sources of demand, which are critical for
understanding the welfare implications of the growth of shadow banking. Moreover, without
a view on its sources, it is di¢ cult to assess the plausibility of the idea that the demand
for money-like claims signicantly increased in the mid-2000s.19 Second, there are external
validity concerns. The results are based on high-frequency variation that I argue is ascribable
to changes in demand. It is not clear that these results can be extrapolated to thinking about
the low-frequency growth of short-term funding in the shadow banking system before the
nancial crisis. Put di¤erently, I am measuring short-term elasticities, which may di¤er from
long-term elasticities.
With these caveats in mind, I do the calculation using the estimates in Panel A of Table
2, which relate net ABCP issuance to spreads. Note that Table 2 is estimated over the entire
sample period, January 2001-July 2007. If the sample is restricted to January 2001-June
2004, the results are statistically similar and a bit larger in magnitude. Consistent with
the idea that the demand for money-like claims increased in the mid-2000s, the T-bill - OIS
spread was 26 bps lower on average from June 2004-July 2007 than it was from January 2001-
June 2004. The results in Table 2 suggest that these lower spreads translate into roughly
30% (percentage points) more total ABCP issuance over the latter period than over the early
19In many narratives emphasizing the demand for money-like claims, the nancial sector itself plays an
important role. For instance, when securities lenders lend out securities to short sellers, they receive cash as
collateral in case the short seller defaults on the loan. They typically invest this cash in money-like claims
because it has to be returned to the short seller immediately whenever the short seller chooses to close the
position. Securities lending grew rapidly in the mid-2000s, securities lenders held signicant quantities of
ABCP (Krishnamurthy, Nagel, and Orlov, 2013).
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period, or approximately 50% of the overall increase in ABCP outstanding.
3.2 The Role of Elastic Supply
Thus, the high-frequency estimates are consistent with the idea that increased demand for
money-like claims played an important role in the growth of shadow banking in the mid-
2000s. For a shift in demand to create the very large change in quantities observed during
that period, it must be the case that the elasticity of ABCP supply is high. The model
suggests one way that the elasticity of supply manifests itself in the data: how strongly the
banking system responds to increases in the federal funds rate.
Proposition 5 Suppose the Federal Reserve wishes to increase its policy rate i. It does so by
reducing the supply of reserves so that @R=@i < 0:The banking system reacts by increasing
the supply of ABCP so that @mABCP=@i > 0. When deposits and ABCP are nearly perfect
substitutes, @mABCP=@i  ABCP=c00; where c () is the cost of manufacturing ABCP. In
this case, @mABCP=@i e¤ectively reveals the elasticity of supply.
The intuition is as follows. The need to hold reserves is e¤ectively a tax banks pay when
they issue deposits. When the Federal Reserve increases the federal funds rate, it increases
this tax. This causes the banking system to substitute towards ABCP nancing. The degree
to which it does so is related to the elasticity of ABCP supply, which is captured by c00,
where c () is the cost of manufacturing ABCP. When c00 is low, the marginal costs of ABCP
production increase slowly, so supply is more elastic and the banking system substitutes
more heavily towards ABCP.
Has the elasticity of supply changed over time? To explore this, Figure 5 examines the
relationship between commercial paper outstanding and the federal funds rate over a longer
period using rolling regressions with data from the Flow of Funds. At each date t, I run
a regression of the change in commercial paper outstanding normalized by GDP on the
change in the federal funds rate over the 5 years following t and plot the coe¢ cient from
that regression. As seen in Figure 5, the relationship has strengthened considerably over the
last twenty years, suggesting supply is substantially more elastic than it used to be.
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This evidence is consistent with the idea that the growth of securitization likely played
an important role in changing the elasticity of ABCP supply. Estimates of the total stock
of securitized bonds before the nancial crisis range from $5-$10 trillion (Gorton and Met-
rick, 2010a). By providing a large, elastic supply of assets that could collateralize ABCP,
securitization could have signicantly increased the elasticity of ABCP supply.20
3.3 The Crisis
The focus of the paper is the growth of the shadow banking system in the years before the
2007-2009 nancial crisis. However, it is worth noting that the money demand narrative is
in broad strokes consistent with the collapse of shadow banking during the crisis as well. In
particular, one can interpret the onset of the crisis as a decrease in the money services o¤ered
by ABCP and other shadow bank debt. In the model presented above, a sudden reduction
in ABCP would decrease the total quantity of money services availableM and thus increase
money premia because demand for money services is downward sloping. This would be
associated with falling yields on Treasury bills and deposits. In addition, the demand for
reserves would rise as banks wished to issue more deposits. To keep the funds rate at its
target, the Federal Reserve would have to increase the supply of reserves. This is precisely
what happened in August 2007, as the market for ABCP collapsed.21
20The evidence is also consistent with the idea that neglected risks played an important role in the boom,
as argued by Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2011, 2012). In the model, we assumed the amount of money
services provided by ABCP, ABCP , did not vary with the quantity of ABCP produced. However, it would
be reasonable to think that ABCP should decline with the quantity of ABCP produced because, for instance,
larger quantities of ABCP must be backed by riskier assets. To the extent that this is the case, it is partially
captured by the assumption that c00 is positive. Assuming that banks face constant benets and increasing
marginal costs of ABCP production has similar implications to assuming they have decreasing marginal
benets and xed marginal costs. Thus, nding a decline in c00, as Figure 5 suggests, is consistent with
the notion that investors began to think the banking system could produce more and more ABCP without
sacricing asset quality. The key question under this interpretation is why investor perceptions changed
beginning in the 1990s.
21See, for instance, http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2007/august/temporary-
reserves-liquidity-injection.
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4 Conclusion
The growth of the shadow banking system is important to understand, both because of the
role it played in the nancial crisis and because it sheds light on the role of nancial innovation
more broadly. A growing literature has emphasized increasing demand for money-like claims
as an explanation for the rise of shadow banking. This literature argues that investor demand
for money-like claims drove the nancial system to manufacture large amounts of short-term
debt, specically ABCP and repo, in the years before the nancial crisis.
Despite the prominence of the money demand narrative, its basic premise remains untested.
Did the short-term claims issued by the shadow banking system provide money services be-
fore the crisis? This paper empirically assesses this question by documenting a novel set
of tight interconnections between the markets for Treasury bills, central bank reserves, and
short-term shadow bank debt. Examining the pre-crisis period from July 2001 through June
2007, I show that the nancial system responds to shocks to the demand for money-like
claims, suggesting that money demand played a signicant role in driving the growth of
shadow banking.
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A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Banks solve
maxbr;dmD; dmABCP F (1  br) R+dmDv0 (M)

M
mD
1=
+ dmABCPABCP v0 (M) M
mABCP
1=
 c ( dmABCP ) brbi
subject to the constraints
br = r (dmD) anddmD + dmABCP  1.
The Lagrangian for this problem is
F (1  r (dmD)) R +dmDv0 (M) M
mD
1=
+ dmABCPABCP v0 (M) M
mABCP
1=
  c ( dmABCP )
 r (dmD)bi + (1 dmD   dmABCP ) :
Di¤erentiating with respect todmD and dmABCP yields two FOCs:
 F  bi r0 (dmD) M
mD
1=
+ v0 (M)

M
mABCP
1=
   = 0
ABCP v
0 (M)  c0 ( dmABCP ) M
mABCP
1=
   = 0:
First note that the  is the shadow cost of the adding up constraint for the banks
liabilities:
 = ABCP v
0 (M)

M
mABCP
1=
  c0 ( dmABCP ) :
If  > 0, the bank would be able to increase prots by using more ABCP funding, except
that it is already nancing 100% of its investment using ABCP and deposits. For a large
enough value of c0, I will be at an interior solution and the constraint is slack. Thus, for a
su¢ ciently large c0 I can take  = 0.
In equilibrium, I have market clearing for reserves with identical banks so
dmD = r 1 (R)
and
ABCP v
0

r 1 (R) 1 + Tm
 1

T + ABCPm
 1

ABCP
 
 1

M
mABCP
1=
= c0 ( dmABCP ) :
(assuming c0 >c). These two conditions pin downdmD and dmABCP .
Finally, I can implicitly dene the quantity reserves R (i) that implements the federal
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funds rate bi = i as
F + i =
v0

r 1 (R (i)) 1 + Tm
 1

T + ABCPm
 1

ABCP
 
 1

r0 (r 1 (R (i))) :
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The following expressions will be useful in deriving the comparative statics:
@M
@
=

M
mD
1=
@mD
@
+

M
mABCP
1=
@mABCP
@
;
@
@

M
mABCP
1=
=
1


M
mABCP
1= 
1
M
@M
@
  1
mABCP
@mABCP
@

;
and
@
@

M
mD
1=
=
1


M
mD
1= 
1
M
@M
@
  1
mD
@mD
@

:
Di¤erentiating the rst order condition (8) with respect to  yields
c00 ( dmABCP ) @ dmABCP
@
= ABCPv
0 (M)

M
mABCP
1=
+ ABCP v
00 (M)
@M
@

M
mABCP
1=
+ABCPv
0 (M)
1


M
mABCP
1= 
1
M
@M
@
  1
mABCP
@mABCP
@

Rearranging I have
@ dmABCP
@
=
1
D
264 ABCP v00 (M) + ABCP v0 (M) 1M

M
mD
1= 
M
mABCP
1=
@mD
@
+ABCPv
0 (M)

M
mABCP
1=
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where
D = c00 (mABCP )  2ABCP v00 (M)

M
mABCP
2=
+
ABCP

v0 (M)

M
mABCP
1= 
1
mABCP
  ABCP
M

M
mABCP
1=
A key feature of the equilibrium is that the Federal Reserve will alter the supply of
reserves so that the federal funds rate remains at its target, bi = i .Thus, di¤erentiating (11)
with respect to  yields
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@bi
@
= 0 = v0 (M)

M
mD
1=
+ v00 (M)
@M
@

M
mD
1=
+v0 (M)
1


M
mD

1
M
@M
@
  1
mD
@mD
@

Plugging in the expression for@ dmABCP
@
yields and simplifying gives
@dmD
@
=  

M
mD
1= 
c00 ( dmABCP ) + ABCPmABCP  MmABCP 1= v0 (M)

v0 (M)
Ac00 ( dmABCP ) + (B1v00 (M) +B2v0 (M)) v0 (M) ;
where
A =
 

M

M
mD
2=
  
mD

M
mD
1=!
v0 (M) + 

M
mD
2=
v00 (M)
B1 =
ABCP 
2


M
mD
1= 
M
mABCP
1=
"
1
mABCP

M
mD
1=
+
ABCP
mD
1=

M
mABCP
1=
+
2ABCP
M

M
mD
1= 
M
mABCP
1=#
B2 =
ABCP 
2


M
mD
1= 
M
mABCP
1=
"
1
mABCPM

M
mD
1=
+
ABCP
mDM
1=

M
mABCP
1=
  1
mABCPmD
#
:
The numerator of @dmD
@
is negative since c00 > 0 and v0 > 0. The rst term of the denominator
Ac00 (mABCP ) is negative if (M=mD)
1= < M=mD, which is the case if and only if  > 1. The
second term in the numerator (B1v00 (M) +B2v0 (M)) v0 (M) is negative since  > 1 implies
that B1 > 0 and B2 < 0. Thus  > 1 is a su¢ cient condition for @dmD@ > 0.
From the market clearing condition for reserves I have r (dmD) = R, which implies that
r0 (dmD) @dmD
@
=
@R
@
:
Since r0 > 0, this implies @R

@
> 0.
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Finally, plugging back into the expression for @ dmABCP
@
yields
@ dmABCP
@
=
2

23ABCP
M

M
mD
2= 
M
mABCP
3=
v0 (M)2 v00 (M)
D [Ac00 (mABCP ) + (B1v00 (M) +B2v0 (M)) v0 (M)]
 
ABCP 
mD

M
mABCP
1= 
M
mD
1=
v0 (M)2
Ac00 ( dmABCP ) + (B1v00 (M) +B2v0 (M)) v0 (M) :
The numerator of the rst term is negative since v00 < 0: The numerator of the second term
is negative. The denominators are negative if  > 1. Thus, if  > 1 I have @ dmABCP
@
> 0.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The Treasury bill yield is given by
RT = R  v0 (M)T

M
mT
1=
Di¤erentiating with respect to  yields
 @RT
@
= Tv
0 (M)

M
mT
1=
+ T v
00 (M)

M
mT
1=
dM
@
+ T v
0 (M)
@
@

M
mT
1=
= Tv
0 (M)

M
mT
1=
+ T v
00 (M)

M
mT
1=
dM
@
+ T v
0 (M)
1


M
mT
1= 
1
M
@M
@
  1
mT
@mT
@

= T

M
mT
1= 
v0 (M) + v00 (M)
dM
@
+
v0 (M)
M
@M
@

I again use the fact that the Federal Reserve adjusts the quantity of reserves so that the
Federal Funds rate remains unchanged. Di¤erentiating (11) with respect to  yields
@bi
@
= 0 = v0 (M)

M
mD
1=
+ v00 (M)
@M
@

M
mD
1=
+v0 (M)
1


M
mD
1= 
1
M
@M
@
  1
mD
@mD
@

and rearranging gives
v0 (M) + 

v00 (M) +
v0 (M)
M

@M
@
=
v0 (M)
mD
@mD
@
:
Substituting this into the expression for the comparative static I have
@RT
@
=  T v
0 (M)
mD
@mD
@
:
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@mD
@
is positive if  > 1. The expression is thus negative.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
First note that
@M
@mT
=

M
mD
1=
@mD
@mT
+ T

M
mT
1=
+ ABCP

M
mABCP
1=
@mABCP
@mT
and
@

M
mABCP
1=
@mT
=
1


M
mABCP
1= 
1
M
@M
@mT
  1
mABCP
@mABCP
@mT

:
Di¤erentiating the rst order condition (8) with respect to mT yields
@ dmABCP
@mT
=
1
D
264  ABCP v00 (M) + ABCP v0 (M) 1M 

M
mD
1= 
M
mABCP
1=
@mD
@mT
+ABCPT 

M
mT
1= 
M
mABCP
1= 
v00 (M) + v
0(M)
M

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where D is dened in the proof of proposition 2 above. A critical feature of the equilibrium
is that the Federal Reserve will alter the supply of reserves so that the federal funds rate
remains at its target, bi = i .Thus, di¤erentiating (11) with respect to mT yields
@bi
@mT
= 0 = T 

M
mT
1= 
M
mD
1= 
v00 (M) +
v0 (M)
M

+
" 

M

M
mD
2=
  
mD

M
mD
1=!
v0 (M) + 

M
mD
2=
v00 (M)
#
@mD
@mT
+
"
ABCP

M
mD
1= 
M
mABCP
1= 
v00 (M) +
v0 (M)
M
#
@mABCP
@mT
:
Substituting for @mABCP
@mT
and solving for @mD
@mT
I have
@mD
@mT
=  

T 

M
mT
1= 
M
mD
1= 
v00 (M) + v
0(M)
M
 
c00 ( dmABCP ) + ABCP mABCP  MmABCP 1= v0 (M)

Ac00 ( dmABCP ) + (B1v00 (M) +B2v0 (M)) v0 (M) :
The denominator is negative if  > 1. The numerator is negative is v00 (M) + v
0(M)
M
< 0,
which will be true if either  or M is su¢ ciently large. In this case, I have @mD
@mT
< 0.
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Plugging back into the expression for @mABCP
@mT
yields
@mABCP
@mT
=
C

22ABCP 
2
M

M
mD
2= 
M
mABCP
2=
v00 (M) D 
mD

M
mD
1=
v0 (M)

D (Ac00 ( dmABCP ) + (B1v00 (M) +B2v0 (M)) v0 (M))
+C
"

 
M
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1=
  1
!
M
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1=#
24

c00 ( dmABCP ) + ABCP mABCP v00 (M) + v0(M)M 
D (Ac00 ( dmABCP ) + (B1v00 (M) +B2v0 (M)) v0 (M))
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where
C = ABCPT 

M
mT
1= 
M
mABCP
1= 
v00 (M) +
v0 (M)
M

:
If  > 1, the denominator is negative. And if v00 (M) + v
0(M)
M
< 0, then C < 0. Thus for 
su¢ ciently large, I have that the overall expression is negative and @mABCP
@mT
< 0.
The Treasury bill yield is given by
RT = R  T v0 (M)

M
mT
1=
:
Di¤erentiating with respect to mT yields
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1=
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
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1= 
1
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M
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
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  1
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
I can sign dM
@mT
using the fact that in equilibrium, the federal funds rate is unchanged. I have


v00 (M) +
v0 (M)
M

dM
@mT
=
v0 (M)
mD
dmD
@mT
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which implies
  @RT
@mT
= T 

M
mT
1= 
v0 (M)
mD
dmD
@mT
  1
mT
v0 (M)

Thus, when dmD
@mT
< 0, I have @RT
@mT
> 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 5
I prove the proposition by di¤erentiating the rst order conditions that dene the equilibrium
with respect to the target federal funds rate i. Di¤erentiating the rst order condition (8)
with respect to i gives
ABCP v
00 (M)

1
r0 (r 1 (R))
@R
@i
+ ABCP
@ dmABCP
@i

= c00 ( dmABCP ) @ dmABCP
@i
;
and simplifying yields
@ dmABCP
@i
=
 ABCP v00 (M)
2ABCP v
00 (M)  c00 (mABCP )
1
r0 (r 1 (R))
@R
@i
:
Di¤erentiating (11) with respect to i yields
r0 (dmD) = v00 (M)  1
r0 (r 1 (R))
@R
@i
+ ABCP
@ dmABCP
@i

+
1
r0 (r 1 (R))
@R
@i
;
and simplifying yields
r0 (dmD) = v00 (M)   c00 (mABCP )
2ABCP v
00 (M)  c00 (mABCP )

1
r0 (r 1 (R))
@R
@i
+
1
r0 (dmD) @R

@i
;
1
r0 (r 1 (R))
@R
@i
= r0 (dmD)   c00 (mABCP ) v00 (M)
2ABCP v
00 (M)  c00 (mABCP )
 1
:
Since w00 < 0, the rst term in the square brackets is negative. Since c00 > 0 and v00 < 0,
the numerator of the second term is negative. Since c00 > 0 and v00 < 0, the denominator of
the second term is also negative. Thus, the full term in the square brackets is negative and
1

@R
@i
< 0.
Finally, plugging back into the expression for @ dmABCP
@i
yields
@ dmABCP
@i
=
 ABCP v00 (M)
2ABCP v
00 (M)  c00 (mABCP )
r0 (dmD)   c00 (mABCP ) v00 (M)
2ABCP v
00 (M)  c00 (mABCP )
 1
:
I know that the term in the square brackets is negative. Since v00 < 0, the numerator of the
term outside the square brackets is positive. Since c00 > 0 and v00 < 0, the denominator of
the term is negative. Thus, the whole expression is positive and @ dmABCP
@i
> 0.
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Figure 1 
ABCP Outstanding  
This figure shows the time series of ABCP outstanding from July 2001-June 2007.  
 
 
Figure 2 
ABCP Issuance and the T-bill - OIS Spread 
This figure plots net ABCP issuance against the value of the T-bill – OIS spread from July 2001-June 
2007. The red line shows the best linear fit. 
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Figure 3 
ABCP Issuance and Treasury Bill Issuance 
This figure plots net ABCP issuance against net Treasury bill issuance from July 2001-June 2007. The red 
line shows the best linear fit. 
 
 
Figure 4 
Reserve Injections and the T-bill - OIS Spread 
This figure plots temporary reserve injections against the value of the T-bill - OIS spread from July 2001-
June 2007. The red line shows the best linear fit. 
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Figure 5 
Relationship between CP outstanding and the Federal Funds Rate over Time 
This figure reports the coefficients from a rolling regression of commercial paper outstanding on the 
Federal Funds rate. At each date we run a regression of the change in commercial paper outstanding 
normalized by GDP on the change in the Federal Funds rate over the following 5 years and plot the 
coefficient from that regression. Confidence intervals (dotted lines) computed using robust standard errors 
are reported. 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the paper.  T-bill - OIS is the spread of 4-
week Treasury bills over the 4-week overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate; ln(ABCP Out) is log ABCP 
outstanding; ∆ ln(ABCP Out) is log net ABCP issuance; ln(T-bills Out) is log Treasury bills outstanding; 
∆ ln(T-bills Out) is log net Treasury bill issuance; Reserves Injected is net reserve injections (repo minus 
reverse repo). The sample runs weekly from July 2001-June 2007.  
 
N Mean sd min max 
T-bill - OIS (%) 288 -0.226 0.193 -1.060 0.018 
ABCP Outstanding ($b) 303 776.0 153.0 633 1189 
ln(ABCP Out) 303 13.54 0.180 13.36 13.99 
∆ ln(ABCP Outt-1) 303 0.002 0.005 -0.016 0.018 
T-bills Outstanding ($b) 303 932.0 75.0 691 1089 
ln(T-bills Outt) 303 6.834 0.084 6.538 6.993 
∆ ln(T-bills Outt-1) 303 0.001 0.020 -0.094 0.048 
Reserves Injected ($b) 303 34.09 12.35 4.75 114.29 
ln(Reserves Injected) 303 3.46 0.410 1.56 4.74 
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Table 2 
ABCP Net Issuance and T-bill Yields 
This table shows regressions of the form  
   1ln  - .t t tABCP OUTSTANDING T bill OIS        
T-bill - OIS is the spread of 4-week Treasury bills over the 4-week overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate, Z-
spread is the spread of 4-week Treasury bills over the yield on 4-week Treasury bills implied by longer-
term Treasury yields. ln(ABCP Outt-1) is lagged log ABCP outstanding, and  ∆ ln(ABCP Outt-1) is lagged 
log net ABCP issuance (the lagged change in log ABCP outstanding). The sample runs weekly from July 
2001-June 2007. YM denotes year-month fixed effects, while WOY denotes week-of-year fixed effects. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, except for the specifications without fixed effects 
which report Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags. In specifications with fixed effects, we report the 
residual R2. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 Panel A: T-bill – OIS Spread 
T-bill - OISt-1 -0.012*** -0.009** -0.009*** -0.013*** -0.012** 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
ln(ABCP Outt-1) 0.002 -0.359*** -0.434*** 
  (0.002) (0.068) (0.071) 
∆ ln(ABCP Outt-1) 0.125* 0.014 0.091 
  (0.069) (0.083) (0.086) 
Constant -0.001 -0.000 -0.022 4.862*** 5.919*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.031) (0.923) (0.969) 
R2 0.169     0.028     0.178     0.224 0.356 
N        287        287        286        286        286 
FE          ---         YM          ---        YM YM, WOY 
 
 Panel B: Z-spread 
Z-Spreadt-1 -0.009*** -0.007** -0.004** -0.009*** -0.008* 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
ln(ABCP Outt-1) 0.005** -0.360*** -0.435*** 
  (0.002) (0.063) (0.064) 
∆ ln(ABCP Outt-1) 0.202*** 0.024 0.085 
  (0.067) (0.079) (0.083) 
Constant -0.000 0.000 -0.072** 4.871*** 5.944*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.029) (0.848) (0.875) 
R2 0.056 0.182 0.127 0.367 0.366 
N    300    300    299    299    299 
FE --- YM --- YM YM, WOY 
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Table 3 
ABCP Net Issuance and T-bill Net Issuance 
This table shows regressions of the form  
    ln  ln -  .t t tABCP OUTSTANDING T bills OUTSTANDING        
ln(ABCP Outt-1) is lagged log ABCP outstanding, and  ∆ ln(ABCP Outt-1) is lagged log net ABCP 
issuance (the lagged change in log ABCP outstanding), and ∆ ln(T-bills Out) is log net Treasury bill 
issuance. Panel A shows the quantity relationship. In Panel B, we instrument for the T-bill-OIS spread 
using ∆ ln(T-bills Outt). The sample runs weekly from July 2001-June 2007. YM denotes year-month 
fixed effects, while WOY denotes week-of-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in 
parentheses, except for the specifications without fixed effects which report Newey-West standard errors 
with 12 lags. In specifications with fixed effects, we report the residual R2. *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Quantity Relationships 
∆ ln(T-bills Outt) -0.035*** -0.017 -0.022* -0.037*** -0.036* 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) 
ln(ABCP Outt-1) 0.006*** -0.368*** -0.433*** 
  (0.002) (0.063) (0.066) 
∆ ln(ABCP Outt-1) 0.211*** 0.027 0.080 
  (0.067) (0.079) (0.083) 
Constant 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.085*** 4.985*** 5.911*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.850) (0.905) 
R2 0.013 0.168 0.122 0.358 0.349 
N 303 303 302 302 302 
FE --- YM --- YM YM, WOY 
 
Panel B: “IV” Linking Quantities and Spreads 
 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
∆ ln(T-bills Outt-1) 1.404*** 
(0.224)  
T-bill - OISt-1 -0.017*** 
 (0.006) 
ln(ABCP Outt-1) -0.366*** 
 (0.070) 
∆ ln(ABCP Outt-1) 0.008 
 (0.083) 
Constant 0.226*** 4.932*** 
(0.004) (0.939) 
R2 0.894  0.357 
N        288        286 
FE        YM        YM 
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Table 4 
ABCP Gross Issuance and T-bill Yields 
This table shows regressions of the form  
   1ln  - .t t tGROSS ISSUANCE T bill OIS       
T-bill - OIS is the spread of 4-week Treasury bills over the 4-week overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate, 
ln(ABCP Outt-1) is lagged log ABCP outstanding, and  ln(Issuancet-1) is lagged log gross ABCP issuance.  
The sample runs weekly from July 2001-June 2007. YM denotes year-month fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. In specifications with fixed effects, we report the residual R2. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Maturity(days): 1-4  5-9  10-20 21-40 41-80 80+ 
T-bill - OISt-1 -0.353*** -0.243 -0.381** -0.172   0.329   0.357 
(0.098) (0.180) (0.149) (0.212)   (0.253)   (0.240) 
ln(Issuancet-1) -0.034 -0.208*** 0.053 0.013    0.340***    0.191** 
(0.071) (0.071) (0.076) (0.070)   (0.084)   (0.081) 
ln(ABCP Outt-1) -1.806 -0.019 -2.946 3.222   -4.558    2.026 
(1.536) (3.331) (2.661) (2.994)   (3.195)   (3.888) 
Constant 36.189* 11.276 48.402 -33.118  68.150 -19.784 
(20.688) (44.953) (36.062) (40.450) (43.168) (52.401) 
R2    0.046    0.044    0.024    0.013    0.099    0.044 
N  287   287  287  287  287  287 
FE  YM   YM  YM  YM  YM  YM 
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Table 5 
Reserve Injections and T-bill Yields 
This table shows regressions of the form 
   1ln  - .t t tRESERVE INJECTION T bill OIS       
The dependent variable is log reserve injections  in week t. T-bill - OIS is the spread of 4-week Treasury 
bills over the 4-week overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate. The sample runs weekly from July 2001-June 
2007. The last 3 columns in both panels exclude weeks when the Federal Reserve Open Market 
Committee meets. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the percentage of reserve injections backed by 
non-Treasury (i.e. GSE debt and GSE-guaranteed MBS) collateral. YM denotes year-month fixed effects, 
while WOY denotes week-of-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, 
except for the specifications without fixed effects which report Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags. 
In specifications with fixed effects, we report the residual R2. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A: Reserve Injections 
T-bill - OISt-1 -0.881*** -0.538** -0.659* -0.862*** -0.563** -0.423 
(0.103) (0.210) (0.364) (0.116) (0.248) (0.438) 
Constant 3.271*** 3.348*** 3.020*** 3.290*** 3.355*** 2.969*** 
(0.034) (0.055) (0.175) (0.037) (0.062) (0.170) 
R2 0.167 0.042 0.46 0.151 0.413 0.432 
N  287  287       287  242  242  242 
FE   ---  YM YM, WOY    ---   YM YM, WOY 
 
 Panel B: Non-Treasury Collateral for Injections 
T-bill - OISt-1 -0.095* -0.379*** -0.382*** -0.295** -0.297* 
(0.051) (0.140) (0.144) (0.154) (0.157) 
nonTreasuryt-1 -0.057  -0.059 
 (0.079)  (0.080) 
ln(T-bills Outt-1) -0.700 -0.711 
 (0.530) (0.536) (0.530) 
Constant 0.227*** 0.159*** 0.172*** 4.927*** 5.062 
(0.015) (0.033) (0.035) (3.682) (3.644) 
R2 0.003 0.381 0.380 0.383 0.382 
N 287 287 287 287 287 
FE  YM YM YM YM 
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Table 6 
T-bill Yields and the Federal Funds Rate 
This table shows regressions of the form 
 - .t t tT bill OIS FFT         
T-bill - OIS is the spread of 4-week Treasury bills over the 4-week overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate, 
FFT is the spread of the Federal Funds rate over its target. All columns except the first and fourth exclude 
days when the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee meets.  The sample runs weekly from July 2001-
June 2007. YM denotes year-month fixed effects, while WOY denotes week-of-year fixed effects. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses, except for the specifications without fixed effects which 
report Newey-West standard errors with 12 lags. In specifications with fixed effects, we report the 
residual R2. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Weekly Daily 
∆ FFTt 0.031 -0.045 -0.067 -0.171*** -0.179*** -0.188*** -0.189*** 
(0.058) (0.075) (0.080) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) 
Constant 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004*** 0.003** 0.003** -0.015 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.029) 
R2 0.003 0.003 0.208 0.052 0.051 0.038 0.076 
N  287  242  242     1061 988 988 988 
FE    --- ---  YM --- ---  YM YM, WOY 
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Table 7 
Aggregate Monetary Quantities and T-bill Yields 
This table shows regressions of the form 
  ln -t t tM T bill OIS       
where Mt is some measure of aggregate money in week t. T-bill - OIS is the spread of 4-week Treasury bills over the 4-week overnight indexed 
swap (OIS) rate. The sample runs weekly from July 2001-June 2007, except for the last column, which runs monthly over the same period. Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. YM denotes year-month fixed effects, while YQ denotes year-quarter fixed effects. In specifications 
with fixed effects, we report the residual R2. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Reserves Deposits 
MMMF 
Retail 
MMMF 
Institutional M2 Fedwire 
T-bill - OISt-1 -0.071*** -0.003 -0.005 -0.008   -0.005** -0.086*** 
(0.015) (0.003)   (0.005) (0.009) (0.002) (0.024) 
Constant 10.662*** 15.432***   6.660*** 7.091*** 8.746*** 14.466*** 
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) 
R2 0.072 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.033 0.190 
N    287      287      287   287        287       66 
FE    YM      YM      YM  YM        YM       YQ 
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Table 8 
Response of Other Issuers 
This table shows regressions of the form  
 1_ - .t t tIssuer Response T bill OIS       
In Panel A, Issuer Response is the aggregate net (long minus short) position of the primary dealers in a given security type. In Panel B, Issuer 
Response is net log issuance of unsecured commercial paper. T-bill - OIS is the spread of 4-week Treasury bills over the 4-week overnight 
indexed swap (OIS) rate, and ln(T-bills Outt-1)  is lagged log Treasury bills outstanding. The sample runs weekly from July 2001-June 2007. 
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. In specifications with month fixed effects, we report the residual R2. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 Panel A: Primary Dealers 
T-bills All Treasuries GSE Debt     MBS     Corp 
T-bill - OISt-1 71286*** 68144*** 64461*** 8442 -18934*** -17995*** 
 (10483) (11957) (16165) (5840) (5882) (5128) 
BAA Spreadt-1 25984 27290 79595*** -15581 -5052 -19416 
 (17582) (17378) (25879) (11058) (15919) (12076) 
Yield Spreadt-1 20880*** 21430*** 9024 -6653* -12902*** -9249*** 
 (6943) (7045) (9365) (3548) (4517) (3472) 
ln(T-bills Outt-1)  30630 33579 5824 -15589 56902*** 
  (48270) (60319) (17501) (25919) (21430) 
Constant -67894* -281819 -461667 91944 168721 -195095 
 (36107) (336007) (419636) (124050) (187614) (150215) 
R2 0.471 0.472 0.439 0.490 0.436 0.499 
N 287 287 287 287 287 287 
FE YM YM YM YM YM YM 
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 Panel B: Unsecured Commercial Paper Issuers 
T-bill - OISt-1 -0.007** -0.016* -0.009* -0.006 
(0.003) (0.009) (0.005) (0.008) 
ln(CP Outt-1)  -0.014 0.100 
   (0.072) (0.066) 
∆ ln(CP Outt-1)  -0.005 -0.725*** 
  (0.009) (0.084) 
Constant -0.001 -0.002 0.066 9.800*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.125) (1.139) 
R2 0.011 -0.056 0.006 0.316 
N 287 287 286 286 
FE  YM  YM 
 
